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The Virtual Reality of the Mind 








In evolutionary terms, imagery developed hundreds of millions of years before symbolic or language-
like systems of cognition.  Even the most abstract reasoning in science and mathematics requires 
imagery:  diagrams and written symbols supplement short-term memory, and richer imagery is essential 
for novel analogies and creative insights.  A cognitive architecture must relate symbols to the perceptions 
and purposive actions of an embodied mind that interacts with the world and with other minds in it.  This 
article reviews the evidence for an internal virtual reality as the foundation for the perception, action, 
and cognition of an embodied mind.  Peirce’s theory of signs is a unifying framework that relates all 
branches of cognitive science, including AI implementations.  The result is a theory of virtual reality for 
cognitive architectures (VRCA) that spans the minds from fish to humans and perhaps beyond. 
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1 Symbols and Imagery 
For years, the mainstream in AI ignored mental imagery or considered it a side effect of perception 
that is irrelevant to cognition.  Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) is based on symbols organized in 
language, logic, networks, rules, frames, or chunks.  But the emphasis on symbols created more 
problems than it solved:  the Chinese room (Searle 1980), symbol grounding (Harnad 1990), and the 
way animals relate their bodies to perception of and action upon the world. 
After millions of years of leaping and swinging through trees, primates developed three-dimensional 
cognition with excellent hand-eye coordination.  Modern humans have not lost those abilities.  Note the 
feats of Olympic gymnasts or basketball players who can score three points while running through 
interference by the opposing team.  To support that ability, their visual system must process two-
dimensional snapshots of a dynamically changing 3-D world, anticipate likely changes, and respond 
appropriately.  Since humans and apes can perform similar kinds of gymnastics, their brains must 
process the same kind of dynamic 3-D geometry.  Either the apes have symbolic systems as advanced 
as humans, or both humans and apes use similar analog methods. 
During the six million years from apes to humans, a modest increase in brain size came with Homo 
habilis about two million years ago.  A significant increase came with Homo erectus about one mya. 
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Deakin (1997) claimed that the need to extend and enhance a protolanguage stimulated “the co-evolution 
of brain and language.”  The greatest increase in modern humans is in the huge cerebral cortex, but the 
cerebellum and brain stem are similar to the apes’.  Figure 1 shows the human cortex overlaid with a 
neurocognitive network by the linguist Sydney Lamb (2016).  The areas in pink are highly active in 
fMRI or PET scans for tasks that involve language semantics; the gray areas are less active for those 
tasks (Binder et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Areas of the left hemisphere that are active in language 
The network in Figure 1 shows links from the image of a fork in the primary visual cortex to Broca’s 
area for pronouncing the word fork.  According to Lamb (2010), each labeled node represents a cortical 
column.  Node C is a column for the concept of a fork.  He placed it in the parietal lobe, which has links 
to the primary projection areas for all sensory and motor modalities.  For the image of a fork, C has a 
link to node V, which connects to percept nodes in the occipital lobe.  For the tactile sensation of a fork, 
C links to node T in the sensory area for the hand.  For the motor patterns for manipulating a fork, C 
links to node M in the motor area for the hand.  For the word fork, C links to node PR in Wernicke’s 
area.  Then PR links to node PA for recognizing the sound and to node PP in Broca’s area for 
pronouncing the phonemes.  
The primary sensorimotor areas are among the gray areas in Figure 1. For each body part, the sensory 
area contains a topographic (point-to-point) map from the skin, and the motor areas map to the muscles 
that control the body parts. The parietal lobes are among the association areas that expanded rapidly in 
the evolution from primitive mammals to apes and humans. To explain “the nature and development of 
imagery and verbal symbolic processes,”  Allan Paivio (1971) proposed a dual-coding theory (DCT) 
with a symbolic verbal system that maps to and from nonverbal imagery.  
If there are two codes, the next question is whether they are processed by the same methods.  In 
ACT-R (Anderson et al. 2004), production rules are symbolic if-then rules.  Images must be mapped  to 
symbols before they can be processed by those rules. In DCT, logogens (symbols) and imagens (percepts 
or larger images) may be stored and processed by the same mechanisms (Paivio 2007).  Marvin 
Minsky’s Society of Mind (1986) supports an a open-ended variety of modules and forms of 
representation. To connect different modules with different representations, Minsky proposed a system 
of K-lines (knowledge links), which allow modules at opposite ends of a K-line to use different 
representations.  A module may interpret messages received via K-lines without any information about  
the internal representations of the sending modules.  In his Emotion Engine, Minsky (2006) proposed 
emotions as the driving forces that motivate the modules and determine the goals to be achieved.  
Since these systems address different aspects of cognition, they could be related as components of a 
larger framework.  ACT-R, for example, might be extended to support both codes of DCT.  The K-lines 
of Minsky’s Society of Mind might represent the same nerve fibers as the links in Lamb’s networks.  In 
Figure 1, for example, the concept node C has long links across different lobes.  Node T has links from 
the hand (afferent nerves); node M has links to the hand (efferent nerves); node V links to nodes for 
visual percepts; and node PP links to nodes that control muscles for producing phonemes. More research 
is needed to relate the details, but the experimental evidence for each of these systems could be 
compatible with a larger framework that addresses the role of mental imagery.  
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Today, the computational methods of virtual reality (VR) are more accurate and effective than 
symbolic reasoning for analyzing and simulating physical transformations.  For every animal, the body 
with its senses and limbs is the focus, principal actor, and reference standard for its own VR.  
Consciousness is the content of that VR.  Charles Sanders Peirce called it “a moving picture of the action 
of the mind in thought.” 
The nature, the role, and even the existence of mental imagery have been controversial.  Pylyshyn 
(2003) presented serious objections, and Kosslyn et al. (2006) responded to them.  Fully embodied 
cognition would require a dynamic 3-D simulation of the body in relation to the environment.  A 
simulation of 2-D retinal images would be insufficient to counter Pylyshyn’s claims.  To support the 
case for imagery, the next section analyzes the operations in the brain beneath the cortex in animals 
from fish to humans. The concluding section shows how Peirce’s logic and semiotic can characterize 
the VR and relate it to perception, action, language, and reasoning about the world. 
2 Cerebellum, Basal Ganglia, and Cortex 
Until the 1980s, the cerebellum and basal ganglia were considered part of the motor system, with 
little or no involvement in cognition.  But the cerebellum, which takes only 10% of the volume of the 
brain, has the majority of neurons in the brain.  In a historical review, Schmahmann (2010) noted that 
patients in the 1980s with subcortical lesions showed symptoms that resembled patients with lesions in 
the cortex itself.  He asked “if the basal ganglia are not only motor but cognitive as well, what about the 
big motor machine at the base of the brain... the cerebellum?”  
In analyzing the role of the cerebellum, Doya (2000) observed “Involvement of the basal ganglia 
and the cerebellum in cognitive functions once was a controversial issue. However, now there are 
abundant brain imaging data showing their involvement in mental imagery, sensory discrimination, 
planning, attention, and language... An important role of the cerebral cortex is to provide common 
representations on which both the basal ganglia and the cerebellum can work together. Unsupervised 
learning of the cerebral cortex may also be the foundation of building modular organization in which 
learning modules in the basal ganglia and the cerebellum are flexibly combined.” 
 
Figure 2. Brain regions for three kinds of learning (Doya 2000) 
Figure 2 summarizes Doya’s three-way distinction. The cerebral cortex can reward and supervise 
learning by the basal ganglia and cerebellum. For reinforcement learning by the basal ganglia, the cortex 
signals the substantia nigra to produce a reward of dopamine.  For supervised learning by the cerebellum, 
the cortex generates a goal or target.  Then the cerebellum subtracts the previous output from the target 
to generate an error correction that refines future outputs.  In a consensus article by 18 coauthors, 
Caligiore et al. (2016) revised and extended Doya’s diagram. For the cortex, they replaced the label 
Unsupervised learning with Hebbian learning. For the basal ganglia, they indicated that reinforcement 
learning generates production rules.  They also added more detail to the boxes.   
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Doya mentioned mental imagery, and the consensus article noted “that the neuronal systems for 
mental imagery and motor preparation are closely related.” They also note that the cerebellum “is 
connected with” the language areas shown in pink in Figure 1.  But the research that led to Figure 2, by 
itself, does not resolve the debates about symbolic reasoning vs. mental imagery. A review of brain 
anatomy from fish to apes provides some perspective:  
Fish lack the neocortex, they have a well-developed midbrain, and their cerebellum is the largest 
component of the brain. For cartilaginous fish such as sharks, the cerebellum may take 42% of the brain 
(Montgomery et al. 2012). Although fish show little evidence of symbolic reasoning, they navigate in a 
three-dimensional environment, catch smaller prey, and avoid larger ones. Since they flex their entire 
bodies as they swim, their brain must relate constantly changing visual images to the changing shape of 
their body, the tactile feel of the flowing water, and the rapid motions of their predators and prey. 
Relative to their size, birds have brains that are comparable to the mammals. But the requirements 
for aerial acrobatics led them to develop a cerebellum that takes about 25% of the brain volume, 
compared to the human 10% (Walsh & Milner 2011). Some birds, especially the ravens and parrots, 
have intelligence that is comparable to the higher mammals.  
For almost 200 million years, the early mammals coexisted with the dominant dinosaurs. To evade, 
outwit, or hide from the huge beasts, most of them remained in their burrows or trees until darkness. 
Dolphins are distantly related to the hippopotamus, which has a brain that is typical of a large herbivore. 
But dolphins live in a three-dimensional environment, compete with sharks, which have a highly 
developed cerebellum, and lack the sharks’ huge olfactory bulb for smelling blood at long distance. 
Those conditions led the dolphins to develop echolocation for finding their prey in murky water and a 
language-like code for communicating and coordinating their actions with other dolphins. To support 
those functions, their brain is comparable to the human size relative to their body weight. But their 
cerebellum is about 15% of the brain size in comparison to the human 10% (Marino 2000).  
Although birds and bats control their wings by different limbs and muscles, the similarities in the 
sensory inputs led to similarities in their cerebellum. There are two kinds of bats:  fruit bats have good 
eyesight and search for stationary food in daylight; insect-eating bats have poor eyesight and use 
echolocation to catch insects in the dark.  Both kinds of bats have a well-developed cerebellum with 
similarities to the relative sizes of the lobes in the bird cerebellum.  For the insect eaters, the computation 
required for echolocation also led to an increase in the lobes that correspond to the lobes for echolocation 
in the cerebellum of the dolphins (Kim et al. 2009).  Despite their poor eyesight, echolocation is 
sufficient for the insect eaters to fly with better speed and accuracy than the fruit bats.  
To use a computer analogy, the cerebral cortex corresponds to the central processing unit (CPU), 
and the cerebellum corresponds to a high-speed, but special-purpose graphic processing unit (GPU). 
Without a GPU, the CPU can do all the computation by itself, but more slowly. Like the CPU, the human 
cortex can learn to do many of the functions of the cerebellum, but not as efficiently. Among the very 
few people who were born without a cerebellum and survived, the best documented is Jonathan Kelleher.  
All his developmental stages were very late.  But after years of speech therapy, physical therapy, and 
special education, he is now a cheerful, friendly, but awkward adult. He is also able to hold a job and 
live by himself (Hamilton 2015).  
Yet even with years of training, Kelleher still has serious cognitive deficits. Brain scans show that 
the cerebellum is highly active in language and mathematics as well as physical activity. Without a 
cerebellum, Kelleher can be trained to do many tasks adequately, but he rarely discovers how to perform 
novel tasks by himself.  The subcortical connections of the cerebellum integrate perception and action 
with the limbic system.  Without them, Kelleher seems to lack the empathy and ability to learn by 
imitating others.  His sister said “He doesn’t really get into this deeper level of conversation that builds 
strong relationships, things that would be the foundation for a romantic relationship or deep, enduring 
friendships.  It can be a little bit surface-level.”  Even so, Kelleher’s surface-level cognition is better 
than the best symbolic systems available today. 
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3 Peirce’s Semiotic Foundation for Cognition 
In the theory of signs or semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce, perception and action are the 
foundation.  Mental imagery is an extension of perception, and symbols evolve from image-like icons 
in all sensory modalities.  The symbol ☎ is an icon of an old-fashioned telephone.  It is now a symbol 
of things that have no physical resemblance to the original.  Its ring tone, which is a symbol of an 
incoming call, evolved from an auditory icon that sounds like the word ring.  But ring tones today seldom 
sound like the iconic ring.  These examples illustrate Peirce’s principle that symbols grow. 
Although Peirce could not know modern neuroscience, his best friend and colleague was William 
James, with whom he analyzed and developed theories that are still actively debated today.  Peirce and 
his student Joseph Jastrow (1884) published the first experimental research in psychology that used 
properly randomized data.  With his article on “Logical Machines” in the American Journal of 
Psychology, Peirce (1887) was also a pioneer in artificial intelligence. 
In his work on logic, Peirce defined all his notations and rules of inference in purely formal terms, 
but he also discussed their linguistic and psychological implications. Among his many intriguing 
insights are the term mental diagram and the claim that his existential graphs “put before us moving 
pictures of thought... in its essence free from physiological and other accidents” (CP 4.8). But he added, 
“Please note that I have not called it a perfect picture. I am aware that it is not so: indeed, that is quite 
obvious.  But I hold that it is considerably more nearly perfect than it seems to be at first glance, and 
quite sufficiently so to be called a portraiture of Thought” (CP 4.11). 
Pietarinen (2006) showed that Peirce’s mental diagrams and moving pictures are intimately 
connected to every aspect of his logic and semiotics. The psychologist Johnson-Laird (2002), who had 
written extensively about mental models, supported Peirce’s claims:  “Peirce’s existential graphs... 
establish the feasibility of a diagrammatic system of reasoning equivalent to the first-order predicate 
calculus. They anticipate the theory of mental models in many respects, including their iconic and 
symbolic components, their eschewal of variables, and their fundamental operations of insertion and 
deletion.”  To relate icons to logic without a prior translation to symbols, Sowa (2015) showed how 
arbitrary diagrams or even pictures could be inserted into existential graphs and processed by exactly 
the same rules of inference used for symbols.  With two additional rules of inference, called observation 
and imagination, information could be transferred from icons to symbols and back again. 
For further discussion of Peirce’s contributions and their relevance to of a cognitive architecture 
based on virtual reality, see articles by Sowa (2006, 2010, 2011, 2014, 2015a, 2015b) and Majumdar 
and Sowa (2009, 2014). 
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